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PROPORTIONALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
WHY EVERYWHERE BUT HERE? 
BERNHARD SCHLINK* 
INTRODUCTION 
Suppose you are a judge—not on a European constitutional court, 
where the principle of proportionality is generally accepted, nor on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, where, according to general wisdom, the principle is hardly 
known and hardly used, but on a fictitious moral court. No statutes, no 
precedent—each case is decided on its moral merits only. Two neighbors, 
John and Frank, who live high up in the  mountains come before you. In the 
middle of a cold and stormy winter night, John took Frank’s four-wheel 
drive car without asking and didn’t return it until the next evening. Frank 
who had wanted to pick up his elderly mother in the morning at the lonely 
bus station in the valley, couldn’t do so. The old lady stood in the cold for 
two hours before the postman drove by; he had to bring her to the hospital 
with frostbite. Frank thinks John should at least apologize for his immoral 
action. John is truly sorry for what happened but thinks he shouldn’t be 
morally blamed. You are the judge—what will you do? 
You ask John how he could do what he did. He explains that he took 
Frank’s car to bring his pregnant wife to the hospital; her water had broken. 
You ask why he didn’t use his own car. He explains that he needed a four-
wheel drive car because it had snowed heavily. You ask why he took the 
car without asking. He points out that he and Frank had often taken and 
used each other’s things without asking and that he hadn’t wanted to wake 
Frank up in the middle of the night. 
Then you turn to Frank. In view of what John has explained, does he 
still blame John for his immoral action? Frank does, because he had told 
John of his plan to pick up his mother the next morning. You confront John 
with this information. He says he is sorry for the old lady’s frostbite but 
that he knew that with the postman driving by nothing serious could 
happen to her, while his wife’s situation was a matter of life and death. You 
call the hospital, and it turns out that indeed John’s wife, who delivered 
 
          *      Professor of Law at Humboldt University Berlin, former Justice of the Constitutional Court 
of  the State of Northrhine-Westfalia. This is the revised version of my Bernstein Lecture given at the 
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unexpectedly early, could have died if she hadn’t reached the hospital when 
she did. And it also turns out that Frank’s mother has recovered well and 
fast. 
Whatever you decide, maybe that John and Frank should reconcile 
because what happened was a chain of unfortunate events, you have 
engaged in a proportionality analysis. You asked Frank about the end that 
he pursued; you found out that the end was legitimate; that his action was a 
helpful, even a necessary means to pursue the end; that there was no 
alternative means that would have harmed Frank and his mother less; and 
that the end, saving John’s wife’s life, was important enough to justify the 
harm done to Frank’s mother. Proportionality analysis is about means and 
ends, and whenever there is no law, here no moral law, specifically 
commanding, prohibiting, or allowing an action, we justify or condemn the 
action based on the legitimacy of the end pursued and on the helpfulness, 
necessity, and appropriateness of the action as a means to that end. 
The proportionality principle thus reads as follows: If you pursue an 
end, you must use a means that is helpful, necessary, and appropriate. A 
means that doesn’t help to reach the end isn’t a real means—to use it would 
be out of proportion. It is also out of proportion to use a means that does 
more than necessary, for example a means which is more harmful or more 
expensive than necessary. It is equally out of proportion to use a means that 
is inappropriate because, even though it is necessary, by using it you do 
more harm than the end is worth or you spend more than you gain. It would 
have been out of proportion and, in our context, immoral if John had taken 
Frank’s helicopter, when, even though he knew how to fly it, he didn’t 
have the skill to land; this would not have helped him to save his wife. It 
would have been out of proportion and immoral for John to take Frank’s 
four-wheel drive car if  John’s normal car would have worked just as well; 
this would have been unnecessary to save his wife. And to take Frank’s 
four-wheel drive car would have been out of proportion and immoral if not 
the life of John’s wife but the life of Frank’s mother would have been in 
serious danger; the action would have done more harm to Frank’s mother 
than good to John’s wife. 
In short: enough is enough and more is too much. More than enough is 
out of proportion, more than necessary is out of proportion, more than 
appropriate is out of proportion. So don’t do more! 
I. PROPORTIONALITY AND BALANCING 
In law the principle of proportionality arises in those cases where 
specific norms commanding or prohibiting specific means or, to be more 
precise, actions that serve people as means, are lacking. The right of self-
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defense is one example. Everyone is entitled to defend his or her life, 
liberty, and property. To pursue this end he or she is entitled to use means 
that would otherwise be prohibited and may thus cheat and strike and 
shoot. No action that might become helpful and necessary for one’s self-
defense is prohibited categorically. But the law doesn’t go so far as to 
allow one to act any way one wants. Unable to deal with the abundance of 
self-defense situations more specifically, it requires proportionate self-
defense. 
Let’s assume there is a lame man who sits on his porch and sees a 
child climbing into his apple tree and picking apple after apple. He shouts, 
but the child just laughs. His only means to drive the child off the apple 
tree is to use a gun that he can reach and to shoot the child down. The 
means of shooting the child is helpful and it is even necessary to reach the 
end of defending his property. But we easily agree that it is inappropriate or 
imbalanced: The life of the child is much more precious than the value of a 
couple of apples. 
Here the balancing of the the property to be saved against the life to be 
sacrificed appears as the last step of proportionality analysis. That is often 
the case. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, for example, 
reviewed whether the state could extract a defendant’s cerebrospinal fluid 
in order to determine his mental capacity. It decided that determining 
mental capacity was a legitimate goal and that the extraction was helpful 
and necessary. However, the court recognized that since the extraction is 
painful and dangerous, the state can require an extraction to resolve only a 
serious crime. Only then are the pain and danger of the extraction and the 
resolution of the crime properly balanced.1  
But sometimes balancing also appears as the framework for 
proportionality analysis. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, in 
reviewing the use of deadly force against fleeing felons, balanced the 
state’s interest in preventing the escape of a criminal with the individual’s 
interest in preserving his or her life. To find the proper balance, the Court 
engaged in a means-end analysis that had the characteristics of 
proportionality analysis even though the court didn’t name it that. The 
court focused on the use of force against fleeing felons as a means and on 
the mean’s end. The end is to protect citizens; therefore, deadly force is 
necessary against a fleeing felon only if he or she poses a serious physical 
threat to a citizen. Only in these situations does the court regard the use of 
deadly force to be properly balanced.2 
 
 1. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 10, 1963, 16 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 194. 
 2. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 27 (1985). 
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In jurisprudence as well as in legal literature, we find balancing used 
both as the last step of proportionality analysis and as the framework for 
proportionality analysis. This can be confusing. But it only means that, as 
happens often, one and the same problem can be tackled from different 
angles. 
II. PROPORTIONALITY IN GERMANY 
In Germany the principle of proportionality came into its own not in 
criminal law or law enforcement but in administrative law, when the police 
act to protect the public.3 From the late eighteenth to the early twentieth 
century, the relevant norm provided little more than a definition of the task 
of the police: The police had to do what was necessary to fight dangers to 
public safety and order.4 The norm was meant to give the police wide 
discretion in fighting dangerous behavior of all sorts, from offending the 
Prussian king at a Socialist rally to building a house without proper 
structural engineering or running a chemical plant without proper waste 
disposal. In the beginning the norm even meant to give the police 
uncontrolled discretion. But once the ideas of individual rights and the 
Rechtsstaat (the state under the rule of law) began to prevail, the courts 
started to institute controls over the police. The days of uncontrolled 
discretion were over. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the 
Prussian High Administrative Court developed this norm, a norm that did 
no more than define the task of the police, into a jurisprudence of 
proportionality. The police were entitled to use only means that were fit, 
necessary, and appropriate or, as it was also called, proportional in the 
narrow sense as opposed to proportional in the wide sense, meaning fit, 
necessary and appropriate. The means had to work, there had to be no other 
means that would be equally effective but less intrusive, and the end had to 
be important enough to justify the intrusion. 
The court had only two normative premises. First, the police were 
entitled to do what was necessary to fight dangers to public safety and 
order. Second, citizens’ life, liberty, and property were protected against 
police intrusion. Together the two premises created a dilemma. It is 
impossible to fight dangers without intruding into citizens’ life, liberty, and 
property.  So how could the police fight dangers, necessarily resulting in 
some intrusion, and at the same time protect citizens against intrusion? The 
court resolved the dilemma by allowing the police to intrude, but not in an 
 
 3. See BODO PIEROTH, BERNHARD SCHLINK & MICHAEL KNIESEL, POLIZEI- UND 
ORDNUNGSRECHT MIT VERSAMMLUNGSRECHT 4-13 (6th ed. 2010). 
 4. ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT FÜR DIE PREUSSISCHEN STAATEN [ALR], Feb. 5, 1794, Part II, 
Title 17, § 10. 
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arbitrary way, and by defining the nonarbitrary way as the proportional 
way. 
In the second half of the twentieth century, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court found itself with two very similar premises and not 
much more.5 The German constitution contains a bill of rights that grants 
individuals a wide variety of rights and freedoms. At the same time, the 
constitution empowers the legislature to limit these rights and freedoms and 
intrude upon them. Here again is the dilemma of how to reconcile these 
conflicting provisions. The constitution’s grant of rights cannot mean that 
the rights always trump the legislature’s power. Nor can the constitution’s 
empowering the legislature mean that the citizens’ rights are meaningless. 
The provisions have to coexist, and again, together they can mean only that 
the legislature is empowered to limit and intrude, but not in an arbitrary 
way. And again, the court defined and still defines this nonarbitrary way as 
the way under the principle of proportionality: The laws that the legislature 
enacts in pursuing its ends must be proportional. 
What other definition of the nonarbitrary way could the court have 
devised? Once there is significant, but not total empowerment to achieve an 
end and to use means to achieve the end, the only way to curtail and control 
the empowerment is to require the means to be proportional. 
Let me give you a few examples. The German constitution protects 
individuals’ freedom to choose and to practice a profession.  At the same 
time, it empowers the legislature to limit this freedom. To safeguard 
patients’ health, the legislature instituted all kinds of controls on 
pharmaceutical sales, among them a limitation on the number of 
pharmacies that can be opened in each district. This was invalidated by the 
Federal Constitutional Court as an unnecessary intrusion into professional 
freedom that was out of proportion; the legislature could and should have 
achieved its goals by instituting regulations on the storing and sales of 
pharmaceuticals.6 The German constitution also protects freedom of 
assembly and at the same time empowers the legislature to limit it. The 
statutory requirement to seek police permission for a public demonstration 
would go too far and would be out of proportion; notifying the police of the 
public demonstration is enough to allow it to make sure that the public 
demonstration doesn’t clash with general traffic.7 The free use of property, 
 
 5. See generally  Bernhard Schlink, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit, in 2 FESTSCHRIFT 
50 JAHRE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 445 (Peter Badura & Horst Dreier eds., 2001). 
 6. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 11, 1958, 7 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 377. 
 7.  Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 14, 1985, 69 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 315.  
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while constitutionally protected, can be limited by statute, among others by 
landmark statutes. A landmark regulation that requires an owner to keep up 
his house even though it has become unusable to him is out of proportion 
and unconstitutional; if the state wants to landmark the house it has to 
expropriate and compensate the owner.8 
III. PROPORTIONALITY WORLDWIDE 
In comparative constitutional law, the principle of proportionality is 
often traced back to German roots.9 Indeed, in the second half of the 
twentieth century, it was after the German Federal Constitutional Court 
used the principle already, that constitutional courts from most European 
countries as well as Israel, Canada, and South Africa, made the principle of 
proportionality the cornerstone of their rights’ and freedoms’ 
jurisprudence.10 But there is nothing inherently German about the roots of 
the principle of proportionality, nor is the introduction of the principle into 
other constitutional contexts a transfer of a German principle. It is a 
response to a universal legal problem. Once it is understood that an 
authority’s reach is extensive but also limited, without the limits being 
specified, the principle of proportionality serves as an instrument for 
reconciling both: the extensive reach with the unspecified limits. 
Therefore the universal legal problem and the principle of 
proportionality as a response to that problem are not restricted to conflicts 
of state versus citizen and citizen versus citizen. When state agencies have 
conflicting powers, that are not clearly defined in their reach and limits, 
and the fiat of a higher authority cannot resolve the conflict, then a court 
must resolve the conflict, and the principle of proportionality can again 
come into play. The U.S. Supreme Court relied on the principle of 
proportionality, perhaps for the first time, in its jurisprudence on the 
 
 8.  Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG][Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 2, 1999, 100 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 226.   
 9.  Aharon Barak, Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 369, 370 
(2007); Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, American Balancing and German Proportionality: The 
Historical Origins, 8 ICON 263, 271 (2010); Christoph Knill & Florian Becker, Divergenz trotz 
Diffusion? Rechtsvergleichende Aspekte des Verhaeltnismässigkeitsprinzips in Deutschland, 
Grossbritannien und der Europäischen Union,  36 Die Verwaltung 447, 454 (2003); Alec Stone Sweet 
and Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 72, 74, 97 (2008) [hereinafter Stone Sweet & Mathews, The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller].  
 10. See Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller: The 
Proportionality Approach in American Constitutional Law, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 367, 379-80 (2009) 
(offering detailed references); Stone Sweet & Mathews, The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller, 
supra note 9, at 74, 112.  
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relation between the federal government and the states under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.11 
But the principle comes into play primarily in conflicts over 
fundamental rights and freedoms and the legislature’s power to limit and 
intrude upon them. Here courts find themselves with the two premises and 
not much more: the first that rights and freedoms are protected against 
limitations and intrusions; the second that these rights and freedoms can be 
limited and intruded upon. Here the answer must be that the limitations and 
intrusions must not be arbitrary, but proportional. 
But rights can also be granted in a different way. The Bill of Rights of 
the American Constitution protects fewer rights than other constitutions but 
protects the most prominent among them categorically. The free exercise of 
religion must not be prohibited; freedom of speech, freedom of the press, 
the right to assemble peaceably must not be abridged. The legislature is not 
empowered to limit these rights or to intrude upon them. This doesn’t mean 
that the rights don’t conflict with goals that the state pursues or with rights 
of other citizens. But without a caveat for legislative limitations and 
intrusions, demarcations and categorizations help resolve such conflicts. 
The jurisprudence draws lines: The exercise of religion may be curtailed 
where a religion-neutral law, as opposed to a religion-specific law, states its 
commands or prohibitions. Speech is not protected when it turns into a 
fight or commercial action or, as obscenity or defamation, lacks the value 
of speech. It may also be restricted where the restrictions are not content-
specific, but content-neutral, and refer only to the time, place, and manner 
of what is said. 
But all of this doesn’t mean that proportionality analysis doesn’t come 
into play in the U.S. Whenever American courts review limitations and 
intrusions with strict scrutiny or a middle tier of scrutiny, or even with a 
requirement of mere rationality, theirs is a means-end analysis that is a 
more-or-less thorough proportionality analysis.12 The often-mentioned, 
praised or criticized American exceptionalism exists. What this means in 
our context is that the word “proportionality” appears only rarely; that the 
means-end analysis is somewhat haphazard; and that balancing and means-
 
 11. See Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights Review 
and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 814-24 (2011) [hereinafter Mathews & Stone 
Sweet, All Things in Proportion?]; J. H. Mathis, Balancing and Proportionality in US Commerce 
Clause Cases, 35 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 273, 273-75 (2008). 
 12.  See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constituitonal Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 
963 (1987); Vicky C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening up 
the Conversation on "Proportionality,” Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 602; 
Mathews & Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion?, supra note 11, at 824-33; DAVOR ŠUŠNJAR, 
PROPORTIONALITY, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, AND BALANCE OF POWERS 146 (2010). 
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end analysis come systematically later. The first approach is to fine-tune 
the realm of the right, to specify its inner limitations before allowing for 
outer limitations by the legislature. Justice Breyer, who advocates 
proportionality analysis for American constitutional law, is right: 
Proportionality analysis would not be something alien to American 
constitutional jurisprudence and scholarship; it would sharpen the 
American methods of balancing, scrutinizing, and rationalizing.13 But I 
understand that American courts and legal practitioners, like courts and 
legal practitioners everywhere, are not too interested in seeing their 
methods of legal reasoning sharpened and thereby their discretion 
restricted. 
With the exception of the American constitution, most modern 
constitutions protect not just a few rights, but a plethora of rights and 
freedom, with the effect that all behavior, all action, and all expression is 
protected, but the state can limit and intrude upon these protections, as long 
as it does so proportionally. Sometimes these constitutions were the 
response to a previous totalitarian or dictatorial regime; lack of freedom in 
all areas of life subsequently leads to an emphasis on the protection of 
freedom in all areas of life as well. But even without the experience of 
totalitarianism or dictatorship, in a world ever-more crowded and ever 
narrower, freedom in all areas of life is ever-more valuable. With the far-
reaching constitutional protection of rights and freedoms, in the last 
decades of the last century the principle of proportionality spread around 
the world. In European countries lacking constitutionally protected rights 
and freedoms or constitutional review, implementation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights into the national legal system leads also to 
implementation of the principle of proportionality into the national 
jurisprudence.14 The European Court of Justice, the European Court of 
Human Rights, and the Panels and the Appellate Body of the World Trade 
Organization all operate under the principle of proportionality.15 
 
 13.  See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW, 159-71 (2010) 
 14.  See Jeffrey Jowell, Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional Judicial Review, 2000 
PUB. L. 671, 678-79 (offering detailed references for the United Kingdom).  
 15.  See Knill & Becker, supra note 9, at 463 (offering detailed references); see generally Stone 
Sweet & Mathews, The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller, supra note 9, at 138-59. On the use of 
the principle of proportionality by the tribunals of the International Center for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes see generally Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New 
Frontier, 4 LAW & ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 47 (2010). 
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IV. PROBLEMS OF PROPORTIONALITY 
It may sound as if I mean to say that proportionality works as the 
solution for conflicts between the legislature and the citizenry—
everywhere and potentially even here in the U.S. But proportionality is also 
the problem. Or, to be more precise, it is a structure within which all kinds 
of problems unfold. 
The first is the problem of insufficient or ambiguous information. It is 
sometimes simply impossible to determine whether a means works and 
whether it is necessary. The fitness and the necessity of a means is an 
empirical problem, and often science, scholarship, and experience can help 
in solving it. But often all one has are assumptions, contradictory 
experiences, and as many expert opinions as there are interests involved. 
Climate change is an example. Beyond a basic agreement that climate 
change is dangerous and has to be countered, information about the extent 
of the dangers and the effectiveness of the countermeasures is ambiguous 
and insufficient. 
The second big problem is that while, at least ideally, it is objectively 
possible to determine whether a means works and is necessary, the 
balancing of rights, interests, and values entailed in the analysis of 
appropriateness is unavoidably subjective. There is no objective standard 
for measuring and weighing free speech vs. privacy, freedom vs. safety, 
privacy vs. public health, or the protection of an endangered species vs. the 
creation of badly needed jobs. 
There are several ways to deal with these two problems. To solve the 
problem of insufficient or ambiguous information, one can establish a 
burden-of-proof rule under which it is either the legislature or the affected 
citizen who has to prove that the means at issue works or doesn’t work, is 
necessary or is not necessary. Let’s assume that to protect the climate, the 
legislature enacts a statute that requires car makers to use very 
sophisticated and expensive exhaust filters, and let’s further assume that the 
effect of the filters is dubious. If the legislature is entitled to limit the 
citizens’ freedom only if it can prove that the statute helps to pursue the 
legitimate end, in this case that the filter actually helps to protect the 
climate, then the statute is unconstitutional. If, on the other hand, the 
affected citizens have to prove that the statute does not help, then the 
legislature enjoys the benefit of the doubt and the statute is constitutional. 
No country’s constitutional jurisprudence, that I am aware of, follows 
either of these two burden-of-proof rules. They all find flexible solutions in 
between. They make the burden of proof shift depending on what is at 
stake. If the citizen’s freedom that is to be limited is regarded as crucial for 
the citizen’s autonomy, and if the end that the legislature pursues is 
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regarded to be of minor importance for the common good, then some 
constitutional courts require that the legislature demonstrate the 
effectiveness and necessity of the statute beyond reasonable doubt. If, on 
the other hand, the end that the legislature pursues is regarded to be 
important, and if the freedom that is to be limited is regarded to be of minor 
relevance, then the courts are more generous toward the legislature and 
allow it to act, even if many questions about the effectiveness and necessity 
of the statute remain unanswered. Of course there are many ways in which 
the burden of proof can shift or even be shared by the court itself; there are 
many degrees of scrutiny; many different notions of what is reasonable and 
what is unreasonable doubt; many different ideas about what is crucial or at 
least relevant for the citizen’s autonomy; and of what is important for the 
common good. So it comes as no surprise that different traditions exist 
regarding how to distribute the burden of proof between the legislature and 
the citizens.16  
Different traditions also exist regarding the second problem 
mentioned: the problem of the unavoidable subjectivity of balancing, the 
other element of proportionality.17 One position, taken by the Supreme 
Court of Canada and also by constitutional scholars around the world, is 
that there is no reason why justices should put their own subjectivity before 
the subjectivity of the legislature. When decisions about how to pursue the 
common good are subjective, then they are political. They need democratic 
legitimization, and the legislature is democratically legitimized to make 
them. Only when decisions can be made on objective grounds are experts 
legitimized to make them. The contrary position, taken most often by other 
courts and their judges, is that they, the legal experts on the constitutional 
or supreme courts, because they are appointed by the president or 
parliament, enjoy at least an indirect democratic legitimacy and 
furthermore have the wisdom and time to balance more calmly and 
carefully the crucial conflicts of a society than the legislature, which acts in 
the turbulence and heat of political battle. And, again, there are many 
positions in between. Most courts claim the right to control the balancing of 
 
 16.  See ŠUŠNJAR, supra note 12, at 83-162 (discussing similarities and differences between the 
jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court, the US Supreme Court, the European 
Council of Human Rights, and the European Court of Justice); Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in 
Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 383, 390 (2007) (noting the 
different traditions of the German Federal Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Canada); 
Mathews and Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion?, supra note 11, at 813-36 (explaining shifts in the 
jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court); Julian Rivers, Proportionality and Variable Intensity of 
Review, 65 CAMBRIDGE L. REV. 174 (2006) (discussing the jurisprudence of British courts); AHARON 
BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 226-40 (2006) (expounding on the Israeli experience). 
 17. Cf. sources cited supra note 16. 
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the legislature and replace it by their own balancing and at the same time 
emphasize their respect for the results of the democratic political process. 
This means that they interfere not always, but only on those occasions 
when they feel a specific urge to do so. Naturally, some courts feel this 
urge on more occasions than others. 
One factor in determining both how the burden of proof is distributed 
between the legislature and the citizens and how activist the courts are 
when balancing becomes the issue, is the democratic and revolutionary 
tradition. In France, with its double tradition of a powerful state and a 
powerful belief in democracy—a belief that, since the French Revolution, 
brought forth almost as many revolutions and constitutions as there were 
generations—the people trust the political process and accept only a rather 
weak judicial control of the legislature. In Germany where, in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the bourgeoisie was too weak to make 
a revolution and instead invented administrative courts for the protection of 
the citizens’ freedom and property, courts and the law enjoy more trust than 
the legislature and politics. Germany is also among those countries where 
the democratic political process led to fascism or communism. These 
countries share a particular hope that a wise and strong constitutional or 
supreme court will tame whatever dangerous tendencies the political and 
legislative process may have. 
Another important factor for the distribution of the burden of proof 
and also for the assignment of the task of balancing is the homogeneity or 
heterogeneity of the people. The more ethnic and religious conflicts there 
are, the more it makes sense to shift some of the burden of integration from 
politics to law and from the legislature to the constitutional or supreme 
court. Canada and South Africa are accordingly countries with activist 
courts. It also doesn’t come as a surprise that in Israel, where legitimacy as 
a Jewish state and legitimacy as a democratic state are not in full harmony, 
the court tries to establish its own legitimacy beyond and independent of 
politics. 
Taking into account all these different shapes and showing all these 
different facets, does the principle of proportionality still have the 
distinctive features that allow us to call it a principle? I don’t hesitate to say 
yes. The principle of proportionality is not a simple principle, easily 
applied and easily yielding answers. It is a complex principle, allowing for 
different interpretations and modifications. But it structures our reasoning 
and guides us on our difficult path to find answers. 
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CONCLUSION 
The principle of proportionality has had a fantastic career: from a 
principle of moral philosophy to a legal principle, from a principle of 
administrative law to a principle of constitutional law. It has been called the 
ultimate rule of law,18 and even though there is no such thing as an ultimate 
rule of law, the principle of proportionality is definitely a rule at which all 
courts ultimately arrive. Even the U.S. Supreme Court, shy about using the 
term, when it engages in means-end-analysis, follows the rule in substance 
again and again. 
Application of the principle has had and will continue to have a 
standardizing effect on different constitutional cultures. Constitutional 
cultures with a doctrinal tradition will progressively be transformed in the 
direction of a culture of case law. The often-praised asset of proportionality 
analysis is its flexibility; from case to case, facts may be assessed 
differently and rights and interests weighed and balanced differently. The 
case-specific configuration of facts, interests and rights becomes more 
important and more significant than the doctrine that surrounds the case. 
Judges become more interested in finding the proportional solution for the 
case than in a decision that fits into established doctrine or helps to modify 
and refine it. On the other hand, the principle of proportionality has a 
certain structuring quality and potency that introduces a minimal doctrinal 
element into constitutional cultures with a case-law tradition. 
Another way of viewing this is to say that the principle of 
proportionality doesn’t have a standardizing effect on different 
constitutional cultures, but rather that it is a standard that constitutional 
cultures share and that they become more and more aware of over time. It 
is part of a deep structure of constitutional grammar that forms the basis of 
all different constitutional languages and cultures. It comes to the surface 
sooner or later—everywhere and even here. 
 
 
 18.  See DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW (2004). 
 
 
